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Abstract
We conduct a public goods game in three small towns in the Indian state of Rajasthan.
Due to historical military conquest, until 1947 these towns were on (barely) opposite
sides of a colonial border separating British India from the Princely States. Our research design offers a treatment comparison between the towns of (British) Kekri and
(Princely) Sarwar, and a control comparison between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely)
Shahpura. We find no significant difference in contributions to home town groups, but
a significant difference in contributions to mixed town groups. Participants in (British)
Kekri are more co-operative (i.e., contribute more) in mixed town groups compared
to those in (Princely) Sarwar. We find the differences are driven by individuals with
family ties to the towns, and we find no differences in the control comparison. Our
results highlight the enduring effects of colonial rule on social norms of co-operation.
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Introduction

Culture has long been one of the “black boxes” of economic analysis. We know it matters,
but it is difficult to pin down theoretically and even more difficult to measure. While numerous recent studies have shown that culture affects economic outcomes and vice versa, much
of the black box remains.1 One important effect (and cause) of culture is its interaction
with institutions: how does culture affect institutions, and conversely, how do formal institutions shape cultural norms and traits?2 A primary difficulty in addressing such questions
is identification: measuring institutions and culture is inherently difficult, as is finding credible instruments for either.3 Three common solutions are: (1) exploiting large institutional
changes such as the rise and fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (Alesina and FuchsSchündeln 2007); (2) historical accidents that offer opportunities for regression discontinuity
(Becker et al. 2016; Buggle 2016); and (3) experiments (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Bigoni
et al. 2016; Karaja and Rubin 2018). Our paper contributes to this literature by combining
a historical natural experiment with a “lab-in-the-field” experiment to study the effect of
institutions on culture and cultural persistence.
We identify institutional causes of contemporary cultural differences within a region of
India that was subject to different degrees of colonial rule. Specifically, we run lab-in-the-field
experiments in towns barely separated by an old colonial border. The three towns—Kekri,
Sarwar, and Shahpura—are located in the present state of Rajasthan. In the colonial period,
the British annexed a small part of Rajasthan, which included Kekri near its border (see
Figure 1). The other towns were part of Princely India (i.e., states where local autonomy
remained with the ruler).
These were historically small towns with populations ranging from 4,000 to 9,000. They
1

See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), Fernández (2011) and Nunn (2012) for excellent surveys of this
literature.
2
For recent works on the interactions between culture and institutions, see Alesina and Giuliano (2015),
Giuliano and Nunn (2017), and Bisin and Verdier (2017).
3
Exceptions include Tabellini (2010) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), among others. Beyond conventional
IV complaints (Young 2017), instruments do not always shed light on the underlying channel of transmission.

1

Figure 1: Map of British and Princely India (modern Indian border), 1911

Source: Government of India (1911).
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continue to remain small today with populations from 20,000 to 40,000 in 2011. In the
pre-colonial period, this part of central Rajasthan shared a common language, culture, and
geography. Ajmer came under direct British rule in the early 19th century when the East
India Company won an important battle against the Marathas (a Hindu state that emerged
following the decline of the Mughal Empire). This led a Maratha leader to cede the territory of Ajmer province to the East India Company. The adjoining states of Kishangarh
(containing Sarwar) and Shahpura entered into treaties with the British whereby the British
controlled their defense and foreign policy, but their local rulers managed internal administration.
Historical records suggest the decision to bring Ajmer under direct colonial rule was the
result of military success and the strategic location of Ajmer city, the capital. Commercial
and agricultural reasons were unimportant because this area was not agriculturally productive; it is near the Thar dessert, which is arid with low and unpredictable rainfall. Kekri,
our experimental town, was on the southeastern edge of Ajmer province. By most accounts
it was a small and inconsequential town that happened to come under direct colonial rule.
Hence, a natural experiment arose in these towns: one was subject to British colonial rule
for idiosyncratic reasons for well over a century, and the others were not.
We test whether (1) experiment participants from (British) Kekri are more co-operative
in standard public good games than participants from (Princely) Sarwar; (2) whether the
differences in co-operation are exacerbated when “outsiders” benefit from the good, and (3)
if there are any differences, whether they are more apparent among participants with family
ties to the town (i.e., those who did not move to the town in their lifetime). If cultural norms
were passed from one generation to the next, it is likely that any inter-town differences are
driven by individuals whose families lived there for multiple generations.
In our lab-in-the-field experiment, participants from each town played standard voluntary
contribution mechanism public goods games (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988a, 1988b; Anderson and Putterman 2006), paired with subjects from their own town and subjects from the
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other towns. Subjects in each town played three single-shot games. The games were identical, other than the group composition. Our research design is unique in that it offers a
treatment comparison between participants in (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar, and
a control comparison between participants in (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura.
If the salient boundary is between British India and Princely India, we should not find
significant differences in contributions between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura.
We summarize our findings as follows. First, we find that participants from (British)
Kekri are more likely to cooperate (i.e., contribute higher amounts) in mixed groups compared to participants from (Princely) Sarwar. Kekri participants contribute 56% of their
endowment to mixed town groups compared to 52% for Sarwar participants (p-value for difference in mean, p = 0.07). In both towns, the mixed groups include two people from their
hometown and two people from the other town (Kekri or Sarwar). When we split the sample
based on a participants’ ties to their town, we find the inter-town differences are driven by
individuals whose parents are from the town.
Second, we also ran mixed group experiments for participants in (Princely) Sarwar and
(Princely) Shahpura. If the differences we observe between Kekri and Sarwar are driven by
the colonial boundary, we would not expect to observe differences in contributions to mixed
groups across the two Princely State towns. The results confirm that the relevant difference
is between British and Princely India. We find no significant differences in contributions to
mixed groups between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura.
Unlike contributions to mixed groups, we find no significant difference in contributions to
hometown groups between (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar. We confirm the findings
in regressions that control for gender, caste, religion, occupation, and education of the participants. We also find similar inter-town differences between (British) Kekri and (Princely)
Sarwar using other variables to capture family ties such as whether a participant lived their
entire life in the town, or whether their grandparents are from the same town. Finally,
we find similar results in individual fixed effects regressions where we compare the same
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individual’s joint contribution to their mixed town group versus their home town group.
Contributions to mixed town groups are lower than home town groups in both, (British)
Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar, but the difference is significantly larger for (Princely) Sarwar.
Moreover, these results are driven by individuals with family ties to the town. What is
the underlying mechanism driving these results? We conjecture the lower out-group bias in
(British) Kekri is due to the historical presence of outsiders, being part of a larger British
Indian state, and perhaps early exposure to municipal taxation. These factors were absent
in (Princely) Sarwar and Shahpura.
Taken together we interpret these results as evidence of historical institutions affecting
contemporary cooperation via an inter-generational (vertical) transmission mechanism (although this is likely reinforced via horizontal and oblique transmission). This is suggested by
the facts that the only salient differences in the decisions of the populations are: i) between
those on opposite sides of the old colonial border; and ii) confined to those whose families are
from the town and are therefore presumably imbued with the culture generated generations
ago. We interpret the observed behavior as evidence of culture consistent with the standard
definition of culture in economics by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006): “those customary
beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from
generation to generation.”
Our paper contributes to three literatures. First, we contribute to the growing literature
on culture and institutions where our focus is on the link from institutions to culture. In
Putnam’s (1993) classic study and the empirical follow-up by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2016), Italian regions that were historically exposed to medieval free cities, an early form
of democracy, have higher social capital today. On a smaller time scale, Alesina and FuchsSchündeln (2007) find that East Germans favor redistribution and state intervention more
than West Germans after reunification even though the two populations were largely uniform
before the rise of Communism. Becker et al. (2016) find that people living within 200
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kilometers of the former Habsburg Empire are more likely to trust state institutions.4 In a
similar regression discontinuity, Peisakhin (2010) surveys 1600 individuals living on either
side of an old Habsburg-Russian border and finds that the border continues to influence
attitudes towards Russia today.
Apart from evidence based on surveys and regression discontinuity, several experimental
papers show how different economic conditions influence outcomes in lab games. For example, Herrmann et al. (2008) find different contributions in public good games across 16 cities
around the world. Subjects in Boston, for instance, with a stronger rule of law are more
cooperative and more likely to punish anti-social behavior compared to subjects in Athens.
Unlike many studies on Europe, our focus on India, a developing country, is unique. We
also find that cultural norms survive for many decades following the end of formal British
colonial rule, which connects to the more general literature on cultural persistence. The
overarching insight in this literature is that culture is “sticky,” and can survive well beyond
the phenomena responsible for its various attributes in the first place (Greif 1994, 2006;
Voigtlaender and Voth 2012; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Giuliano and Nunn 2017;
Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017; Greif and Tabellini 2017; Nunn and de la Sierra 2017).
Second, our paper contributes to the large literature on the legacy of European colonialism
on the fortunes of former colonies. Such work offers two not mutually exclusive explanations
linking history to the present: institutions and culture. One school of thought argues that
colonizers often set up extractive institutions that persist and lead to poor outcomes after
colonization (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Nunn 2008;
Dell 2010).5 Indeed, legal systems imposed by colonizers are correlated with many current
economic outcomes (la Porta et al. 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). Another school of
thought suggests the more egregious aspects of colonization, namely slavery and thoughtless
border assignment, affected cultural traits such as trust that are still observable in the
4

In a paper using a similar lab-in-the-field on a natural experiment methodology, Karaja and Rubin (2018)
find persistent effects of the Habsburg-Ottoman border on contemporary trust.
5
However, “extractive institutions” were not present everywhere, even in erstwhile extractive colonies. See
Dell and Olken (2017) for an example of colonial provision of public goods.
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present (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). We study
three Indian towns that were similar before (British) Kekri came under colonial rule in an
accident of history. While some effects of British institutions have faded in India (Banerjee
and Somanathan 2007, Chaudhary and Garg 2015), we find enduring effects of colonial rule
on cultural norms of cooperation.
Third, our paper contributes to a growing literature exploiting lab-in-the-field techniques.
Unlike traditional experiments that use convenient samples of college students, the lab-inthe-field approach takes validated experiments from the lab to field populations that cannot
be studied in the lab. Our paper is closest in spirit to Robinson (2016), Gangadharan et
al. (2017), Lowes et al. (2017), and Karaja and Rubin (2018) who also use lab-in-thefield experiments across plausibly exogenous borders to test whether culture “sticks” despite
changing economic and political circumstances. However, to our knowledge, our paper is
the first to employ such a methodology in a colonial setting that was responsible for stark
institutional differences when compared with nearby, non- (or weakly-) colonized regions.
While our design has some nice features—namely a plausibly exogenous treatment combined with an incentivized test of behavior—we recognize that it comes with drawbacks. For
one, its external validity is not obvious. We report the results of experiments in three Indian
towns, which may be idiosyncratic. Yet, our results in conjunction with other studies using
a similar methodology (Robinson 2016; Lowes et al. 2017; Karaja and Rubin 2018), which
report similar findings, along with a larger literature on the “stickiness” of culture, suggests
that our results are consistent with the literature.
Second, our experiment may be considered (very) low-N : while over 500 people participated in our games, we are primarily interested in inter-town differences. We get some
traction around the low-N by exploiting variation in participants family ties to their town.
This would be a bigger issue if we were the first to test for inter-regional cultural differences,
or differences between colonized and non-colonized regions. Our results that former colonial
borders matter for cultural outcomes today are consistent with a large literature on the en-
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during effects of colonialism. If our results are indeed idiosyncratic, they are so in a manner
that is consistent with a much larger N , which we believe to be unlikely. Finally, there is
the issue of replication: these results would almost surely be impossible to replicate in the
three towns that we study, since much of their relatively small populations have already been
exposed to the experiment. That said, replication across similar historical borders elsewhere
in the country would be possible and indeed informative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the historical setting of
the natural experiment we exploit in this paper. Section 3 describes the experimental design
and implementation. Section 4 offers an informal theoretical framework, Section 5 presents
the experimental results, Section 6 discusses potential mechanisms driving the results, and
Section 7 concludes.

2

Historical Background on Locations

Our lab-in-the-field experiment exploits a historical boundary between British India and
Princely India. During the colonial period, the British directly controlled roughly two-thirds
of the Indian subcontinent. The remaining territories, known as Princely States or Native
States, came under the rule of various hereditary kings. Such states negotiated treaties
with the British whereby they continued to exist as independent states while recognizing
the supreme authority of the British Government (House of Commons 1913, p. 14). As
a rule, Princely States were not allowed to engage in political or military relations with
other Princely States. In exchange for giving the British control over their defense and
foreign policy, the colonial government allowed them to manage their local administration.
As seen in Figure 1, the Princely States were scattered throughout the country with larger
concentrations in western and central India.6
6

As the Mughal Empire declined in the early 18th century, many regional states emerged to replace Mughal
rule. The strongest of these states (the Maratha Dominion in western India, Hyderabad in the Deccan
plateau, and Mysore in southern India) wrestled for control with the East India Company. After multiple
battles and alliances with regional powers, the Company emerged triumphant by the early 19th century, with
the largest territories under their command. British India included the coastal provinces of Bengal, Bombay,
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We focus in this paper on the historical boundary of British and Princely India in the
present day state of Rajasthan in north-western India (called Rajputana in the colonial
period). We selected this region because the historical evidence suggests that British annexation in Rajputana resulted from military conquest and not its economic characteristics,
such as agricultural or commercial potential. In the colonial period, much of Rajputana
was divided into numerous Princely States under the control of patrilineal clans known as
Rajputs. These states had pre-colonial roots predating the arrival of Europeans. They
nominally came under the control of the Mughal Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries,
but Rajput rulers retained strong local autonomy by marrying their daughters to Mughal
emperors (Ramusack 2004).
As the Mughal Empire declined in the 18th century, parts of Rajputana came under the
control of the Marathas.7 Following years of payments to the Marathas and frequent attacks
by Maratha-associated raiders (known as Pindaris), the Rajput states solicited military help
from the English East India Company in the early 19th century. The Company defeated
the Marathas and the Pindaris. As a result the Maratha leader Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded
the central part of the region (namely Ajmer) to the British in 1818. The remaining Rajputana States surrounding Ajmer signed treaties with the Company guaranteeing their local
independence and status as Princely States.
Our experiment targets three towns located along this historical border of the Ajmer
province of British India and two Princely States immediately surrounding Ajmer (Kishangarh and Shahpura). Kekri, the town in former British India, was historically part of
the Kekri sub-division in the south-eastern portion of Ajmer. Sarwar, a town in the former
and Madras and the alluvial plains along the Ganga river valley. Most of north India also came under direct
British control by mid-19th century. The Company initially set up trading posts in Indian ports under
the patronage of Mughal emperors. Hence, the first territories to come under British rule were along the
coast. As the British gradually annexed new territory over the ensuing century, they favored agriculturally
or commercially advanced regions. Arid deserts in the west and parts of central India with low agriculture
potential were intentionally left under the control of local rulers.
7
The Maratha Empire was a Hindu Empire that rose from western India to control vast territory in the
18th century. In the early years of the late 17th century, the Marathas were constantly fighting the Mughal
Empire but towards the end of their rule in the early 19th century, they were in constant conflict with the
East India Company.
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Princely State of Kishangarh, lies 17 kilometers northwest of Kekri. Shahpura, the capital
of the former Princely State of Shahpura, lies 46 kilometers southwest of Kekri. The inset
of the map in Figure 1 shows the princely towns located in the larger (yellow) state and the
British India town (Kekri) located in the smaller (white) region.
We selected these towns because they are located in close proximity to each other, were
barely on opposite sides of the old colonial border, were of comparable size and shared a
common history before Kekri came under direct British rule. Both states were small states
carved out of the larger Rajput states of Ajmer and Jaipur in the Mughal period. Jaipur
was a state adjoining Ajmer, which had similar culture and geography. In both cases the
original founders received these lands as a reward from Mughal emperors for their military
service.8
Kishangarh was founded by the Rathor clan of Rajputs that ruled the larger state of
Jodhpur to the west of Ajmer. On account of a family feud, the original founder (Kishan
Singh) moved from Jodhpur to Ajmer. In 1611, the Mughal Emperor Akbar gave him some
villages to rule that were part of the neighboring Jaipur state. Kishan Singh named this area
Kishangarh and established a town of the same name as his capital city. In the early 18th
century, the area of Sarwar was added to Kishangarh as a reward to the ruler for providing
military service to Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah I. Similarly, the Mughal Emperor Shah
Jahan rewarded the founder of Shahpura with land that was part of the crown lands of
Ajmer.
In short, the historical boundary separating Kekri in British India from Sarwar and
Shahpura in Princely India was a result of military conquest unrelated to economic features
of these towns. Although the city of Ajmer, the capital city of Ajmer province, was an
important historical city because of its central location, this was certainly not true for Kekri,
a small town on the outskirts of Ajmer province.
8

We are not the first to recognize the natural experiment potential of this region. Similar to our approach,
Verghese (2016) selected Jaipur and Ajmer districts for a matched qualitative comparison to assess the
effect of direct colonial rule on post-colonial conflicts in these areas. He argues (British) Ajmer is a good
comparison to (Princely) Jaipur because of their shared history, language, and culture.
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Table 1 summarizes the population of these towns from the 1931 and subsequent censuses.
In 1931 all three towns were classified as Class V municipalities with populations of 4,000
to 10,000. As of 2011, they are still small municipalities with populations ranging from
20,000 to 42,000. They were and continue to remain Hindu majority towns with similar
proportions of historically marginalized groups such as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes.9 Their Muslim population jumps around with more changes in Kekri. The 1961
decline in the Muslim share in Kekri is likely due to the Partition of India. Rajasthan
borders Pakistan, and there was some out-migration of Muslims from Rajasthan to Pakistan
(Census of India, 1951).
In terms of administration, Ajmer became a Class C state that came under the Central
Government after independence. However, it was converted into a district of Rajasthan state
as part of the 1956 Indian States Reorganization Act. At the time, Sarwar was merged to
Ajmer district. Indeed, (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar have been under the same
district administration for over 60 years. The town of Shahpura has been part of the neighboring district of Bhilwara since independence. Ideally, we would want the towns balanced
on every single dimension. In our case, however, this was not feasible. So our selection
emphasizes their shared history, size, close proximity to each other, current administration,
and some demographics.

3
3.1

Experiment Design and Implementation
Experiment Design

In our lab-in-the-field experiment, we use the standard version of the linear public goods game
(i.e., voluntary contribution mechanism) that has been played in labs across the United States
and Europe (Isaac and Walker 1988a, 1988b; Andreoni 1988; Ledyard 1995; Anderson and
Putterman 2006; Chan et al. 2008; Brandts and Schram 2008; Chaudhuri 2011). Participants
9

Data on SC/ST is not reported at the town level in 1931.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Towns
1931 Census of India
% Male % Hindu % Muslim

Town

State

Pop

Kekri
Sarwar
Shahpura

British India
Kishangarh
Shahpura

7,179
4,000
9,298

50.76
52.15
50.43

Town

District

Pop

% Male

Kekri
Sarwar
Shahpura

Ajmer
Ajmer
Bhilwara

12,394
6,182
12,165

52.30
52.26
52.17

Town

District

Pop

% Male

Kekri
Sarwar
Shahpura

Ajmer
Ajmer
Bhilwara

41,890
20,372
30,320

50.93
51.38
50.39

73.88
71.50
77.37

26.03
21.25
17.25

% Christian
0.13
0.00
0.01

1961 Census of India
% SC
% ST
% Muslim
19.16
14.70
16.70

0.00
2.65
2.38

7.20
24.49
13.56

2011 Census of India
% SC
% ST
% Muslim
18.10
14.88
19.29

0.90
3.95
2.66

% Christian
1.43
0.15
0.28

% Christian

14.14
33.61
18.36

0.90
0.05
0.03

Sources: Census of India, 1931, 1961 and 2011. SC is Scheduled Castes and ST is Scheduled Tribes.

from the three towns played the same public goods game three times. In each game, they
were first told they were a part of a group of four members, drawn either from their own
town or some combination of their town and one of the other two towns. While they knew
the towns of the other group members, they were not told the names of any member of their
group. The groups were randomly assigned via spreadsheet and even the experimenters did
not know the identities of the group members.
In the game, each participant was given an endowment of 150 rupees ($2.25) to be
split between an individual pot and a joint pot. Participants made only one decision on
how much to contribute to the joint pot: 0, 50, 100, or 150 rupees. Participants made
their contribution by circling any of the four numbers 0, 50, 100, or 150, representing their
contribution as shown in Figure 2. All contributions to the joint pot were then doubled and
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split evenly among the four group members. Hence, each participant’s total earnings was
the sum of their individual contribution (i.e., the amount they did not contribute to the
joint pot) plus a quarter of the doubled group contribution. Since there is low and varying
levels of education in India, we used discrete rupee amounts as opposed to the more standard
terminology of tokens, so subjects would not have to make an extra calculation from tokens
to monetary earnings. After explaining the game using text and pictures, the experimenters
reviewed a simple quiz to ensure subjects understood the game.10
Figure 2: Experimental Handout

Subjects played the game three times. In experiment (A), participants were told they
would be placed in groups of four with three other participants from their town. In experiments (B) and (C), participants were told they would be placed in a group with one member
from their town and two from one of the other towns. Table 2 describes the experiment
treatment for each town. Other than the change in group composition, the experiments
were identical. Our set-up can thus be viewed as a single-shot version of the standard linear
game repeated three times with different group members.
Many studies have found that repeated public goods games lead to decay in subsequent
rounds with lower contributions to the joint account (Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). To
address this concern, half the participants in each town were randomly assigned to play the
10

Experimenters reviewed each quiz question until the subjects could perform the simple calculations adding
together their individual and group contribution under different scenarios. For a complete set of experiment
instructions (in English), see Appendix B. In the Appendix we also include the quiz (Appendix B.2),
post-experiment survey (Appendix B.3), and the pictorial representation that experimenters reviewed with
participants (Appendix B.4).
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Table 2: Treatments
Historical
Polity

Order

Kekri

British
India

Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura 80
Sarwar-Kekri-Shahpura 74

Sarwar

Princely
State

Sarwar-Kekri-Shahpura 100
Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura 100

Shahpura

Princely
State

Shahpura-Kekri-Sarwar 100
Kekri-Shahpura-Sarwar 100

Town

N

Notes: Home town groups consist of four players from the same town. Mixed town groups consist of two
players—oneself and a participant from one’s town—and two participants from other town. Hence, for the
Kekri order Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura, the first experiment group contains only participants from Kekri, the
second (third) experiment group contains the subject and one other participant from Kekri, with the other
two group members from Sarwar (Shahpura).

experiments in order ABC, and the other half were assigned to play in order BAC (see Table
2). After playing the games the subjects completed a short demographic survey.

3.2

Implementation in Rajasthan

We hired Indicus Analytics (part of Nielsen India), an economics research firm based in New
Delhi, to conduct the experiments across the three towns in Rajasthan in October 2016.
Before the actual experiments, a pilot experiment was carried out in the town of Tijara,
which is located in another district of Rajasthan. The pilot was completed in September
2016. We selected Tijara because it was similar in size (population 20,000) to the experiment
towns.
In preparation for the experiments, local IRB approvals were secured and local officials
in each town, including the police commissioner, were informed of the exercise. We never
discussed with the Nielsen team why these towns were selected. As far as we know they were
unaware of the historical boundaries between the towns. This is especially true for Kekri
14

and Sarwar, which are located in the same district today. Hence, the experimenters were
blind regarding the research question, the composition of the groups, and the choices made
by one’s group members.
Similar local facilities in each town were secured to conduct the experiments. 200 participants, all of whom were 18 years or older, were recruited per town. Local recruiters
used the same script, informing individuals that they were running an experiment on how
people make decisions on behalf of researchers in India, the UK, and USA. If they agreed to
participate, they would receive 100 rupees ($1.50) with a potential to earn more money. The
unskilled daily wage in Rajasthan is around 200 rupees while the skilled daily wage is around
230. If individuals expressed an interest in participating, they were given information on the
day and time of the experiments. Subjects were recruited a day or two in advance of the
actual experiments.
On account of the Indian setting of small towns with low levels of schooling, the experiments were conducted individually over two days per town (i.e., experimenters conducted
the experiment with only one participant at a time). Each experimenter used the same
instructions to explain the experiment, showed the pictures explaining the experiment and
reviewed the quiz questions. After the subjects circled their choices, the experimenter entered their responses to the short survey. In each town the process took around an hour per
person and around 100 individuals played the experiments per day. Participants were paid
their participation fee in cash on the day of the experiment. The team returned one week
later to pay the experimental earnings.
In Sarwar the experiments were conducted on October 4-5, 2016. In Shahpura they were
conducted on October 8-9, 2016. In Kekri 154 experiments were conducted on October
6-7, 2016. We were unable to complete the remaining 46 subject experiments on the 7th
because unrecruited persons from the town showed up at the experiment facility wanting to
participate. Since they had not been recruited and were calling on more people to participate,
the experiments were paused for the day. The team returned on October 20, 2016 to complete
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the individual experiments for the remaining 46 people. We suspect there was local chatter
in Kekri about these experiments between October 7 and October 20 that influenced the
decisions of the October 20th participants. The local chatter would likely have been about
strategies to maximize individual pay-offs. If this were the case, we would expect to see
the October 20th Kekri participants to contribute less in all three games. Appendix Table
A.1 shows the differences in contribution for each experiment between the October 6-7 and
October 20 participants. Indeed, the means in Appendix Table A.1 show that the October
20 participants contributed less in both home town and mixed town groups compared to the
October 6-7 participants. On account of this contamination and potential “gaming” of the
experiments, we drop these 46 participants from the analysis.

4

Theoretical Framework

Participants in each town played three standard public goods games (i.e., the voluntary
contribution mechanism). In these games, they were given an endowment of W , chose to
contribute yi to the joint account (i.e., public good), and kept what they did not contribute
in their private account, i.e., W −yi . Their contributions to the joint account were multiplied
by x > 1, and the joint account was distributed evenly among the N members of the group.


P
x
Thus, each individual’s payoff was Pi = (W − yi ) + N ∗ yi + j6=i yj . In our experiment,
W = 150, x = 2, and N = 4. The choice yi was limited to the set {0, 50, 100, 150}. As
long as 0 <

x
N

< 1, the money-maximizing dominant strategy of this single-shot game is

yi = 0, or the free-riding outcome. On the other hand, the co-operative and Pareto-optimal
outcome is yi = W , the maximum. Similar to the provision of public goods in the real world,
this game mimics the tension between self-interest and co-operation.
Beginning with early work in sociology and political science (Marwell and Ames 1979,
1980; Orbel 1981), a large literature has shown that people give more than the free-riding
Nash equilibrium (Ledyard 1995). In the lab, contributions range from 40% to 60% of
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the endowment, halfway between the free-riding and Pareto-optimal contribution. Why
do people contribute? Lab experiments suggest people give more because of social norms,
altruism, the “warm glow” of giving, and beliefs about other group members’ contributions,
i.e., reciprocity (Andreoni 1990; Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). While we have learned
much about why people contribute in the lab, we know less about whether historical exposure
to major institutions affects the degree of co-operation observed in such games. Our lab-inthe-field experiment is designed to test whether populations exposed to direct colonial rule
in the past behave differently today from populations exposed to indirect rule.
Our experiments are three single-shot games where every feature of the game is identical
other than group composition. Subjects play with one home town group and two mixed
town groups. Our field experiment is similar to Partner and Stranger lab games. In such
games, subjects are either paired in groups with the same subjects and play repeated games
(partners), or subjects are rematched in groups after each single-shot game (strangers). As
noted by Andreoni and Croson (2008), the findings from such experiments are mixed. A
third of the studies find partners give more than strangers, a third find strangers give more
and a third find no difference in contributions. In spite of these differences, these games have
taught us that (1) confusion alone does not explain positive contributions (Andreoni 1995),
(2) subjects’ beliefs about how much other members of the group will contribute affects
contributions (Croson 1998), and (3) the “warm-glow” of giving is more important than
altruism (Palfrey and Prisbey 1997). Hence, in our experiment it is possible that subjects’
beliefs about the contributions of people from the other town in British India or Princely
India, their desire to match those contributions, and their degree of “warm-glow” towards
other townspeople affect contributions in home town and mixed town groups.
The primary questions our experiment is structured to address are: (1) whether historical exposure to princely rule (Princely India) engenders different norms of co-operation
today compared to areas under direct colonial rule (British India); and ii) whether historical
exposure to princely rule (Princely India) engenders different norms of co-operation today
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with people from British India. We conjecture the colonial border was indeed salient and
may have contributed to differences in co-operative norms that persist to today. This may
be true to the extent that “culture” is conceptualized as a simplifying heuristic through
which individuals comprehend the complex world around them (Boyd and Richerson 1985;
Henrich et al. 2001; Guiso et al. 2006), and that “culture” is passed down, to some extent,
vertically from parent to child (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Bisin and Verdier 2001; Nunn and
Wantchekon 2011; Dohmen et al. 2012; Giuliano and Nunn 2017; Iyigun and Rubin 2017).11
To this end, our experimental design splits subjects into a “treatment” group and a
“control” group. Our treatment comparison is Kekri and Sarwar. These two towns were
(barely) on opposite sides of the old border, with Kekri in British India and Sarwar in a
Princely State. Moreover, they are now part of the same administrative district, meaning
that any co-operative norms observed today cannot be attributed to differences in modern
governance. The control comparison is Sarwar and Shahpura. They were both located in
Princely States. They serve as a useful control because it is possible that people in Sarwar
and Kekri act differently for reasons unrelated to their history of colonial rule. If this is true,
we would also expect differences to arise in the comparison between Sarwar and Shahpura.
Yet, if the old colonial border is the salient difference, participants in Sarwar and Shahpura
should act similarly in the different public goods games.
Our experiment first tests whether princely rule (Princely India) engenders different
co-operative norms today compared to areas under direct colonial rule (British India). It
is unclear ex-ante whether we would expect subjects from British India to give more or
less to own-town groups compared to those in Princely India. While (British) Kekri had
an earlier legacy of municipal taxation, suggesting higher contributions, town identity was
likely stronger in (Princely) Sarwar where local Indian rulers provided public goods albeit in
a more centralized fashion. Being part of a small local state may have also made co-operation
11

The other mechanisms of cultural transmission are horizontal (via peer group) and oblique (via education).
See Boyd and Richerson (1985), Henrich (2001), Bisin and Verdier (2008), Tabellini (2008), Guiso et al.
(2008), and Mokyr (2016). Since we cannot test these transmission mechanisms, we constrain our predictions
to the vertical transmission mechanism.
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with co-townspeople historically more valuable in (Princely) Sarwar. To test this possibility,
we compare contributions in experiment (A), i.e., contributions to co-townspeople, between
(British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar.
Second, our experiment tests whether princely rule (Princely India) engenders different
contributions today when groups are “mixed” (i.e., there are two participants from one’s
home town and two from another town). There is a large experimental literature on “ingroup” versus “out-group” giving.12 While such group dynamics have been shown to be
created in the lab (Tajfel et al. 1971; Chen and Li 2009), field experiments find significant
in-group bias when group identity is based on nationality (Robinson 2016), East/West culture
(Yuki et al. 2005), ethnicity (Robinson 2016), historical polity (Karaja and Rubin 2018),
and kibbutz membership (Ruffle and Sosis 2006). In short, a host of deeply-seated cultural
identity markers create in-group and out-group dynamics that affect economic decisions (as
posited theoretically in Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Our paper builds on this literature by
testing whether exposure to colonial rule generates different out-group bias between groups
that were and were not exposed.
For the treatment group (Kekri and Sarwar), the appropriate comparison is the participants’ decisions in experiment (B), in which participants were all placed in groups comprised of two members from (British) Kekri and two members from (Princely) Sarwar. For
the Sarwar-Shahpura control group, the appropriate comparison is the participants’ decisions in experiment (C), in which they were placed in groups comprised of two members
from (Princely) Sarwar and two members from (Princely) Shahpura. This serves as a useful
control because if the out-group bias is driven by idiosyncrasies in the Kekri and Sarwar
populations, unrelated to historical differences, then we would expect to observe differences
in out-group contributions in the Sarwar-Shahpura comparison as well.13
12
13

For reviews of this literature, see Brewer (1999) and Balliet et al. (2014).
We cannot directly compare contributions in the mixed Kekri-Shahpura groups because their order was
not randomized. These mixed group experiments were always Experiment (C) for Kekri subjects, unlike
Shahpura where they were Experiment (A) or (B). We thus cannot draw a meaningful inference from their
comparison because of decay effects in repeated public goods games. Given our budget we randomized order
in the Kekri-Sarwar comparison.
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5

Results

5.1

Demographic Characteristics of Participants

Before presenting the results of the experiment, we present balance tests across all three
towns on basic demographic characteristics, derived from the survey administered after the
experiment. Nielsen recruited participants so that there was as much balancing as possible
across readily identifiable markers such as gender and age. As our summary statistics suggest,
while Nielsen was broadly successful, this effort did come with some drawbacks, which we
try to control for in the data analysis.
The demographic summary statistics are reported in Table 3. Around 40% of the participants were female in all three towns, with no statistically significant difference between
any of the towns. In the “treatment” comparison, Kekri vs. Sarwar, there is no statistically
significant difference in the fraction of young participants (around 1/3 are under 25 in both
groups). However, in the “control” comparison the Shahpura sample appears to be younger
(0.53 vs 0.30 under 25 years old, p = 0.000). Kekri participants are on average a little more
educated than those from Sarwar (0.56 vs. 0.68, p = 0.026), less likely to be Muslim (0.03
vs. 0.34 and 0.45 for Sarwar and Shahpura) and more likely to be from a lower caste (0.55
vs. 0.20 and 0.23 for Sarwar and Shahpura).14
While in an ideal experiment we would have had equal weights across religion and caste,
in reality this was difficult to implement. Since participants were only told the town in which
their group members came from, we have every reason to expect that participants would expect to be grouped with an “average” member of the other town, where the weights are based
on the actual population, not the sample in our experiment. Moreover, in the data analysis
we show individual fixed effects regressions comparing contributions across experiments for
the same individual. Balance is less of a concern in the individual comparisons. We also
14

We also asked numerous questions about participants’ financial history (i.e., borrowing and lending). The
averages are reported in Appendix Table A.2. There are few statistically significant differences across towns
in any of the participants’ personal finance characteristics.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, Demographics

Town
Kekri (British)
N = 154

Female
0.46
(0.04)

Age
Under 25
0.34
(0.04)

Married
0.68
(0.04)

Less Than
High School
0.56
(0.04)

Muslim
0.03
(0.01)

SC/ST
0.55
(0.04)

Sarwar (Princely)
N = 200

0.41
(0.03)

0.30
(0.03)

0.70
(0.03)

0.68
(0.03)

0.34
(0.03)

0.20
(0.03)

Shahpura (Princely)
N = 200

0.39
(0.03)

0.53
(0.04)

0.69
(0.03)

0.57
(0.04)

0.45
(0.04)

0.23
(0.03)

0.387
0.180
0.611

p-values: Difference in Means
0.378
0.639
0.026
0.000
0.001
0.791
0.850
0.000
0.000
0.828
0.030
0.032

0.000
0.000
0.470

Kekri vs. Sarwar
Kekri vs. Shahpura
Sarwar vs. Shahpura

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. SC/ST refers
to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

show results where we restrict the analysis to non-Muslims and non-SC/ST (see Appendix
A for results). Our individual fixed effects and split sample results are similar to the main
results.
One problem with having an unbalanced sample on the religion and caste dimensions is
that these features may correlate with income, which itself likely affects one’s willingness
to contribute to a joint pot. To address this issue, we turn to the economic characteristics
of the participants, as seen in their occupational status. In the post-experiment survey,
participants were given seven occupational options to choose from: own account worker
(self-employed), unpaid family worker, regular salaried or wage worker, casual wage laborers,
student, employer, and seeking and/or available for work.15 The occupational summary
statistics are presented in Table 4. Reassuringly, the occupational distributions are broadly
the same across the three towns. Around 1/3 of participants are self-employed, and another
1/4 are unpaid family workers. Around 10-15% of participants are regular wage workers,
15

We did not include the option for “student” in the survey, but our enumerators noted it as one’s occupation
if the participant claimed to be a student.
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casual wage laborers, and students. A very small proportion are employers or seeking work.
Table 4: Summary Statistics: Occupations

Town
Kekri (British)
N = 154

SelfEmployed
0.31
(0.04)

Family Regular
Worker Wage
0.29
0.16
(0.04)
(0.03)

Casual
Laborer
0.09
(0.02)

Student Employer
0.11
0.01
(0.03)
(0.01)

Seeking
Work
0.04
(0.02)

Sarwar (Princely)
N = 200

0.38
(0.03)

0.29
(0.03)

0.14
(0.02)

0.07
(0.02)

0.07
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.03
(0.01)

Shahpura (Princely)
N = 200

0.28
(0.03)

0.23
(0.03)

0.15
(0.03)

0.13
(0.02)

0.16
(0.03)

0.03
(0.01)

0.03
(0.01)

Kekri vs. Sarwar
Kekri vs. Shahpura
Sarwar vs. Shahpura

0.143
0.605
0.034

0.964
0.224
0.212

0.454
0.182
0.476

0.454
0.454
1.000

p-values: Difference in Means
0.580
0.589
0.129
0.880
0.311
0.181
0.668
0.096
0.003

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.

Next, we turn to participants’ history in the town, knowledge of people from the other
towns, as well as the degree to which they trust people. The results are summarized in Table
5. Unlike in the previous table, we divide responses into “Treatment” and “Control” groups.
This is necessary because of how we define the “outsider” group. In the Treatment, the
outsider group for Kekri participants is Sarwar and vice versa. In the Control, the outsider
group for Shahpura participants is Sarwar and vice versa.
First, we asked participants in the post-experiment survey how long they and their families have lived in the town. Around

3
4

of participants have lived in the town their entire life

and have parents from the town. These numbers are not statistically different across towns.
Second, we asked them if they knew someone from the other two towns in question. Here,
outsiders are defined by the group that participants played with in experiment (B). There
is no statistically significant difference in the fraction of participants who know outsiders in
the treatment comparison (Kekri vs. Sarwar, 0.54 vs. 0.61, p = 0.151) or in the control comparison (Sarwar vs. Shahpura, 0.31 vs. 0.35, p = 0.400). It is unsurprising that inter-town
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Table 5: Summary Statistics: Life History, Local Knowledge, and Trust

Town

Parents
from Town

Kekri (British)
N = 154

0.80
(0.03)

Sarwar (Princely)
N = 200

0.74
(0.03)

Lived in Town
Know
Trust
Entire Life
Outsider Co-townspeople
Treatment Group
0.76
0.54
4.14
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.09)
0.77
(0.03)

0.61
(0.03)

4.05
(0.07)

Trust
Outsiders
3.42
(0.08)
3.52
(0.07)

Sarwar (Princely)
N = 200

0.74
(0.03)

p-values: Difference in Means
0.908
0.151
0.153
Control Group
0.77
0.31
4.05
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.07)

Shahpura (Princely)
N = 200

0.80
(0.03)

0.83
(0.03)

3.90
(0.09)

3.11
(0.06)

0.181

p-values: Difference in Means
0.106
0.400
0.574

0.366

0.189

0.35
(0.03)

0.377
3.21
(0.07)

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The “Trust
Co-townspeople” and “Trust Outsiders” variables are on a 1-5 scale. For the ”Parents from Town” column,
N=141 in Kekri, N=188 in Sarwar, and N=197 in Shahpura. Sarwar statistics are the same in the Treatment
and Control groups with the exception of how the “Outsider” town is defined. It is defined as Kekri in the
Treatment group and Shahpura in the Control group. For both Kekri and Shahpura, the “Outsider” town
is defined as Sarwar.

familiarity is lower in the control comparison, since Shahpura is further away from Sarwar
than is Kekri. Finally, we asked participants to rate how much they trusted co-townspeople
and outsiders on a 1-5 scale (with 1 being extremely untrustworthy and 5 being extremely
trustworthy; see Appendix B.3 for details). Such responses are likely endogenous to the
event under study and even the perhaps the experiments themselves. But, they are useful
to report in any case. Not surprisingly, on average people trust co-townspeople more than
they do outsiders. In both the treatment and control comparisons, these differences are not
statistically different.
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5.2

Group Contributions in Treatment and Control Groups

We now turn to the experiment results. We first show histograms of the joint contribution
in the different experiments. Figure 3 shows the distribution of joint contributions to the
insider and outsider groups within our treatment group (i.e., Kekri and Sarwar). The outsider
group in both towns is composed of four members: the subject, a member from their own
town and two members from the other town. Thus, both Kekri and Sarwar’s outsider group
includes two people from Kekri and two from Sarwar, corresponding to experiment (B). In
the histograms, experiment (B) is referred to as the mixed town group.
The first column of Figure 3 shows the participants joint contribution in groups comprised
solely of co-townspeople, i.e., experiment (A). Participants from (Princely) Sarwar are more
likely to contribute 50 and 100 rupees to their home town groups. Indeed, the free-riding
contribution of 0 rupees is rare at 1.5 percent of participants. In Sarwar, 30 percent of
participants contribute 50 rupees, 50 percent give 100 rupees and 19 percent give 150 rupees.
Although participants from (British) Kekri never contribute 0 rupees, their contributions are
similar to those from Sarwar. In Kekri, 28 percent of participants contribute 50 rupees, 43
percent give 100 rupees and 29 percent give 150 rupees. More people in (British) Kekri give
the Pareto-optimal contribution of 150 rupees.
The second column of Figure 3 shows participants’ joint contribution in mixed town
groups, i.e., experiment (B). One pattern immediately jumps out: participants in both towns
contribute significantly less to their outsider group than insider group. In US laboratory
settings, early experimental work found individuals were more cooperative in groups with
strangers than partners (Andreoni 1988). Some studies have confirmed those early findings
and others have found opposite results (Tajfel et al. 1971; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001;
Yuki et al. 2005; Ruffle and Sosis 2006; Balliet et al. 2014; Robinson 2016; Karaja and
Rubin 2018). But we are not matching people as partners in a lab setting. Rather, our
insider group consists of people from the same town where families have lived together for
generations. It is unsurprising then that Indian subjects are more cooperative with their
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Figure 3: Histograms of Contributions in Treatment Groups, Kekri and Sarwar

fellow townspeople.
Compared to the insider group contributions, the difference between Kekri and Sarwar
in the outsider group is more striking. Participants from (British) Kekri are more likely
to contribute sums closer to the Pareto-efficient outcome of 150 rupees when matched in
outsider groups than are participants from (Princely) Sarwar. Forty-four percent of Kekri
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subjects contributed 100 rupees to the outsiders group and another 16 percent gave the
Pareto-efficient contribution. In comparison, 39.5 percent of Sarwar subjects contributed
100 rupees and just another 10 percent chose the Pareto-efficient contribution of 150 rupees
when matched in outsider groups with people from Kekri.
These figures suggest subjects in (British) Kekri are more cooperative, especially in outsider groups, than subjects in (Princely) Sarwar. Although we offer subjects only a discrete
option for their joint contribution—namely 0, 50, 100, or 150 rupees—our findings are in
line with other studies of single-shot public goods games (Andreoni and Croson 2008). Contributions often range from 40 to 60 percent of the initial endowment. Our contributions fall
on the higher end of this range at 50 to 60 percent of the 150 rupees endowment across the
experiments.
In Figure 4 we show these distributions for Sarwar and Shahpura, both towns located in
former Princely India. In this case the outsider group for both includes two individuals from
Sarwar and two from Shahpura, corresponding to experiment (C). As seen in the graphs, the
distribution of joint contributions to the insider and outsider groups are remarkably similar
for Sarwar and Shahpura. We do not observe the difference seen in Figure 3 between Kekri
and Sarwar. Indeed, if the differences in cooperative behavior are on account of the historical
legacy of direct and indirect colonial rule, then we should not find differences in cooperation
within outsider groups between Sarwar and Shahpura, both towns of former Princely India.
The histograms in Figure 4 support this hypothesis.
Figure 5 and Table 6 summarize the contributions to the joint account in the three
towns, confirming the patterns seen in the histograms. The top panel of Table 6 shows that
participants from (British) Kekri contribute more to both their co-townspeople as well as the
mixed group relative to participants from (Princely) Sarwar (p = 0.073 and 0.074). None of
the “control” comparisons between Sarwar and Shahpura are statistically significant.16
16

In Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4, we limit the sample to only non-Muslims and non-SC/ST castes, respectively. Since the distributions of these cultural features are different among participants in different towns in
the experiment, these results address whether our findings are simply being driven by demographic features.
Yet, we find this not to be the case; results are very similar to those reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: Contributions to Joint Account
British
India
Kekri

Princely
State
Sarwar p-value
All Observations
78.3
0.074
(2.52)
52%

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

84.7
(3.24)
56%

Contribution to Home
Group (Insiders)
As % of Endowment

100.7
(3.06)
67%

93.0
(2.58)
62%

More to Home (0/1)

0.40
(0.04)

0.41
(0.03)

Observations

Princely Princely
State
State
Sarwar Shahpura

p-value

76.3
(2.67)
51%

78.0
(2.87)
52%

0.591

0.073

93.0
(2.58)
62%

96.5
(2.80)
64%

0.349

0.720

0.41
(0.03)

0.40
(0.03)

0.760

200

200

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

200
Parents are from Town
85.8
77.3
0.055
(3.90)
(2.94)
57%
52%

76.3
(3.16)
51%

78.7
(3.23)
52%

0.530

Contribution to Home
Group (Insiders)
As % of Endowment

96.9
(3.40)
65%

93.5
(3.06)
62%

0.528

93.5
(3.06)
62%

94.9
(3.20)
63%

0.733

More to Home (0/1)

0.36
(0.05)

0.44
(0.04)

0.222

0.42
(0.04)

0.36
(0.04)

0.281

113

139

139

157

Observations

154

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The “Outsiders” decision in the Kekri vs. Sarwar comparison is Decision B, where participants from Kekri shared
a group with those from Sarwar and vice versa. The “Outsiders” decision in the Sarwar vs. Shahpura
comparison is Decision C, where participants from Sarwar shared a group with those from Shahpura and
vice versa.
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Figure 4: Histograms of Contributions in Control Groups, Sarwar and Shahpura

The bottom panel of Table 6 refines these findings, focusing only on participants who
noted in the post-experiment survey that their parents are from the town.17 This allows us
to address the possibility that our results hold more strongly for participants whose parents
17

Separately, we also analyzed the contributions of participants whose parents are not from the town. While
there are some statistically significant differences across towns, the N is too low in these comparisons to
draw any meaningful conclusions. We hence do not show separate results for this split sample, but they are
available upon request.
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Figure 5: Average Contributions by Family Ties to Town

(and previous generations) are from the town. The idea is that if the mechanism leading
to more (or less) cooperation with outsider groups is on account of historical institutional
differences, then we expect to observe differences based on a subject’s family ties to the town.
Indeed, we find that average contributions in outsider groups are much higher in (British)
Kekri than in (Princely) Sarwar among participants whose parents are from the town (85.8
vs. 77.3, p = 0.055), while contributions to co-townspeople is not statistically different
(96.9 vs. 93.5, p = 0.528). In the control group, the differences in contributions between
participants from (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura are small in magnitude and
statistically insignificant. We summarize the main results as follows.
Result 1 Participants from (British) Kekri are more co-operative in outsider groups than
those from (Princely) Sarwar. This result is driven by participants whose parents are from
the town.
Result 2 There are no differences in out-group giving in the control comparison of (Princely)
Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura.
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5.3

Regression Results

Our results above are simple comparisons of means. They do not control for the order of the
experiments or individual characteristics. Such factors are likely correlated with individual’s
decision-making. We therefore present results using ordered probit and individual fixed
effect regressions. The ordered probit regressions exploit cross-sectional variation across
individuals controlling for their demographic characteristics. In our case, contributions are
ordinal outcomes increasing from 0 (low) to 150 (high). Since we observe few individuals
selecting 0, we combine 0 and 50 into a single category.
In Table 7, we show the results for the treatment group (Kekri and Sarwar) in columns
(1)-(3) and the control group (Sarwar and Shahpura) in columns (4)-(6). In the treatment
group, we focus on the outsider mixed group experiment (B) in the top panel, while in the
control group, we focus on the outsider mixed group experiment (C) in the top panel. In
both groups, we focus on the co-townspeople group experiment (A) in the bottom panel. All
regressions include an indicator if the insider group experiment (A) was played second. We
cluster the standard errors by town and experiment order.18
In specification (1), we do not include any demographic controls. Here, the coefficient on
the Sarwar dummy shows that individuals from (Princely) Sarwar are less likely to contribute
100 and 150 rupees compared to individuals from (British) Kekri. In terms of marginal
effects, the probability of Sarwar participants contributing 100 rupees is 5.4 percentage
points less than Kekri participants.19 We find a similar negative effect of 5 percentage points
for 150 rupees. In contrast, the probability of Sarwar participants contributing 0 or 50 rupees
is 10 percentage points higher for Sarwar participants. When we include the demographic
controls in specification (2), the coefficient on the Sarwar dummy increases. The probability
of participants in Sarwar contributing 100 rupees is 8 percentage points lower than Kekri,

18

We ran similar regressions to those reported in Table 7, with one regression omitting Muslim participants
and the other omitting SC/ST participants. These results are reported in Appendix Table A.5. The results
are similar to those reported in Table 7.
19
In all marginal effects calculations the other independent variables are held at their mean values.
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while the probability of contributing 0 or 50 rupees is 15 percentage points higher.

Table 7: Ordered Probit, Contribution to Mixed Town and Co-townspeople Group
(1)

Sarwar
Order

N
Sarwar
Order

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Parents
Parents
All
All
from Town
All
All
from Town
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Mixed Town Group
Treatment Group (Kekri vs Sarwar) Control Group (Sarwar vs Shahpura)
-0.264*** -0.409***
-0.599***
-0.099
-0.082
-0.057
(0.052)
(0.082)
(0.135)
(0.077)
(0.089)
(0.169)
0.099
0.089
0.196*
0.186** 0.178**
0.206
(0.060)
(0.065)
(0.102)
(0.080)
(0.077)
(0.142)
354
354
Dependent Variable:
-0.213*** -0.178**
(0.015)
(0.085)
0.097*** 0.070***
(0.010)
(0.015)

252
400
400
296
Contribution to Co-Townsperson Group
-0.017
-0.114*** -0.057
0.086
(0.130)
(0.024)
(0.045)
(0.078)
0.020
0.039
0.035
0.079**
(0.030)
(0.024)
(0.026)
(0.032)

N

354

354

252

400

400

296

DEMOG

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Notes: Ordered probit coefficients. Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second.
Demographic controls include indicators for female, age 15-25, married, less than upper secondary education,
Muslim, and scheduled caste/scheduled tribe.

Specification (3) presents the results only for individuals whose parents are from the
town. The coefficient on the Sarwar dummy is larger in magnitude and highly significant in
the mixed town group, but it is small and statistically insignificant for the co-townspeople
group.
In specifications (4)-(6), we run similar regressions for the control group (Sarwar vs.
Shahpura), using experiment (C) for the mixed town group and experiment (A) for the cotownspeople group. There are no statistically significant differences between towns in either
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the mixed town group or the co-townspeople group once we include covariates. In Table 8 we
confirm the patterns observed in Table 7 using two other measures of a participant’s ties to
the town, namely whether their grandparents are from the town and whether they have lived
their entire life in town. Participants with strong ties to the town make lower contributions
to mixed town outsider groups in (Princely) Sarwar compared to (British) Kekri. We do not
observe such differences in the control comparison of Sarwar and Shahpura. In short, the
results reported in Tables 7 and 8 broadly confirm the patterns observed in the comparison
of means.

Table 8: Ordered Probit, Contribution to Mixed Town and Co-townspeople Group
(1)

Sarwar
Order

N
Sarwar
Order

N
DEMOG

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Grandparents Entire Life
Grandparents Entire Life
All
from Town
in Town
All
from Town
in Town
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Mixed Town Group
Treatment (Kekri vs Sarwar)
Control (Sarwar vs Shahpura)
-0.409***
-0.483**
-0.516***
-0.082
0.008
-0.086
(0.082)
(0.191)
(0.085)
(0.089)
(0.194)
(0.113)
0.089
-0.107
0.187***
0.178**
0.053
0.260*
(0.065)
(0.110)
(0.032)
(0.077)
(0.174)
(0.133)
354
191
270
400
227
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Co-Townsperson
-0.178**
0.288**
-0.057
-0.057
0.176***
(0.085)
(0.133)
(0.139)
(0.045)
(0.068)
0.070***
0.104
0.071*
0.035
0.111***
(0.015)
(0.070)
(0.041)
(0.026)
(0.021)
354
YES

191
YES

270
YES

400
YES

227
YES

319
Group
0.043
(0.040)
0.039**
(0.018)
319
YES

Notes: Ordered probit coefficients. Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second.
Demographic controls include indicators for female, age 15-25, married, less than upper secondary education,
Muslim, and scheduled caste/scheduled tribe.

We can also exploit variation within individuals in our experimental set-up. Each indi32

vidual played multiple single-shot games. This allows us to test if contributions in mixed
town groups compared to home town groups are significantly lower for Sarwar participants
compared to Kekri. In particular, we create a panel dataset of just Sarwar and Kekri participants with two observations per individual: their contribution in experiment (A), the
home town group, and their contribution in experiment (B), their mixed town group. We
then run an individual fixed effects regression of the joint contribution as the explanatory
variable. We include an indicator for mixed town experiment, an interaction of mixed town
experiment with the Sarwar dummy, and an indicator if the experiment was played first.
Table 9 shows the results for Kekri and Sarwar. Participants in both towns contribute
lower amounts to mixed outsider groups than their insider groups. Contributions to mixed
town groups are 16 rupees (18 percent) lower than home town contributions. The effect
is large and significant across the different samples. However, the effect is heterogeneous.
While the coefficient on the interaction between Sarwar and the mixed group experiment is
positive in the full sample, it is large and negative for individuals with family ties to the
town. For example, in specification (2), where we restrict the sample to individuals whose
parents are from the town, (British) Kekri participants contribute 11 rupees less to mixed
town groups compared to 16 rupees less for participants from (Princely) Sarwar. We find
similar results for individuals whose grandparents are from the town and for those who have
lived their entire life in the town. Interestingly, we do not find a strong out-group bias among
people whose families are not from Sarwar in specifications (3), (5) and (7). If anything,
they show less out-group bias compared to participants from Kekri.
In Table 10 we shows the individual fixed effect results for Sarwar and Shahpura. Here we
are comparing the results in experiment (A) to the results in experiment (C). Participants
in Sarwar and Shahpura also contribute less to their mixed town outsider group than to
their home town insider group. But we find no heterogeneous effects for Sarwar participants
with family ties to the town in specifications (2), (4) and (6). We see Sarwar participants
with no family ties to the town contributing more to the joint pot compared to Shahpura
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Table 9: Individual Fixed Effects, Contributions in Kekri and Sarwar
(1)
All
Mixed

Sarwar*
Mixed
Order

N
R2

-15.887***
(0.030)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Grandpar. from Town
Entire Life in Town
Parents from Town
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Dependent Variable: Contributions to Joint Pot
-10.672*** -28.678*** -5.580*** -24.187*** -13.563*** -22.839***
(0.206)
(0.179)
(0.068)
(0.106)
(0.044)
(0.449)

1.137***
(0.030)

-5.398***
(0.144)

21.504***
(0.128)

-7.794***
(0.108)

11.652***
(0.004)

-3.440***
(0.047)

15.357***
(0.567)

0.578
(0.767)

2.320
(1.222)

1.487
(2.500)

-4.235**
(0.753)

10.201***
(0.677)

1.463*
(0.568)

-1.654
(5.539)

708
0.651

504
0.612

154
0.762

382
0.626

276
0.702

540
0.623

168
0.748

Notes: The observations are at the individual*experiment level.
Standard errors clustered by
town*experiment order in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Order is an indicator if the
experiment (home or mixed town) was played first.

participants with no family ties.20 Again, it seems that people who move to Sarwar have less
out-group bias than those that move to either (British) Kekri or (Princely) Shahpura. We
are cautious drawing conclusions from these results on movers, other than documenting they
exist. This is because different factors likely affect the selection of movers into each town.
And, they are small in number accounting for fewer than a third of our sample. Both the
ordered probit and individual fixed effects regressions confirm the summary patterns shown
in the previous subsection.

20

Some people did not answer whether their parents and grandparents are from the town. Hence, the number
of people with parents from the town and parents not from the town is not equal to the number of people
that lived entire life in town and did not live entire life in town.
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Table 10: Individual Fixed Effects, Contributions in Sarwar and Shahpura
(1)

Mixed

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Parents from Town Grandpar. from Town Entire Life in Town
All
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Dependent Variable: Contributions to Joint Pot
-15.375** -13.192* -25.795*** -10.702 -22.202*** -12.317 -28.331***
(4.147)
(5.229)
(0.899)
(7.170)
(1.134)
(5.532)
(2.510)

Sarwar*
Mixed

1.750
(2.764)

-0.721
(3.736)

16.367***
(0.551)

-3.418
(5.107)

11.423***
(0.723)

-1.190
(3.709)

13.546***
(1.704)

Order

6.250
(6.181)

6.385
(8.245)

9.918***
(1.207)

-0.179
(11.318)

16.335***
(1.654)

8.993
(8.279)

-3.953
(3.661)

800
0.689

592
0.692

178
0.694

454
0.690

316
0.713

638
0.679

162
0.742

N
R2

Notes: The observations are at the individual*experiment level.
Standard errors clustered by
town*experiment order in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Order is an indicator if the
home town group experiment was played first.

6

Discussion

Why would an old colonial boundary affect norms of co-operation today? We consider a
few candidate explanations from the literature on colonialism and institutions. According to
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), European colonizers established more extractive
institutions in places with high settler mortality where Europeans were unlikely to settle
in large numbers. Extractive institutions tend to be correlated with weak property rights
and low provision of public goods (Dell 2010). However, property rights in our towns, as in
colonial India, were not weak. Indian firms did not fear colonial expropriation (Roy 2011,
Roy and Swamy 2016, Roy 2017).
India-specific debates on the effects of colonialism range from positive (Ferguson 2003)
to negative (Bagchi 1982).21 Yet, Iyer (2010) offers the only credible empirical evidence by
21

Roy (2011) offers a balanced assessment of India’s economic performance under British rule noting the
positive and negative aspects of colonial rule.
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controlling for positive selection into British India. She finds that areas under direct colonial
rule have worse economic outcomes today compared to areas under indirect rule (Princely
States). However, the latter states did not have better outcomes because of higher taxes
or political engagement. Rather, Princely States were better governed because their Indian
rulers feared British annexation. While better governance may have engendered norms to
follow rules, it is unclear if better governance is a complement or substitute to cultural
norms promoting co-operation. For example, Lowes et al. (2017) find that people from the
historical Kuba Kingdom in Central Africa are less likely to follow rules and more likely to
cheat compared to people from just outside the Kingdom. Their findings support theoretical
work by Tabellini (2008) on the interaction between external rules and the values parents
choose to pass on to their children. In our setting, the Princely States were too small to
fear British annexation and their rulers were never reprimanded for misrule (or, at least,
the historical records do not mention the British discussing governance in these states). If
anything, (British) Kekri had earlier exposure to municipal taxation compared to (Princely)
Sarwar, which we discuss next.
In terms of public goods, the three towns were close to the Rajputana-Malwa railways.
They had a few schools and a small police force. Yet, there were differences. (British) Kekri
had an early and more modern municipal board. The Kekri municipality was established in
1879. It funded itself via an octroi tax on consumption goods brought in the town. According
to the Administration Report of Ajmer-Mewara for 1899-1900 (1901), octroi taxes accounted
for 82 percent of municipal revenues. Kekri spent these municipal funds on fourteen categories of expenditures ranging from administration, lighting, police, and social public services
such as medical dispensaries and schools. The board had nine nominated members that met
two to four times a year.
Such municipal boards were less common in our experiment towns of Princely India. Even
when they existed, as in Kishangarh city, there is no mention of town-level taxation. In both
the Kishangarh and Shahpura Princely States, a majority of state revenues came from land
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taxes. A council of a few ministers would advise the ruler on revenue collection, judicial
matters, and public expenditures. Decisions were more centralized in Princely towns compared to (British) Kekri. The historical records mention a municipal committee established
in Kishangarh, the capital city of Kishangarh, but there is no mention of such a committee
in Sarwar. Even in the capital city the committee provided fewer services as compared to
in Kekri. Per the Imperial Gazetteer (1908), the Kishangarh municipal committee, established in 1886, managed lighting, conservancy, and slaughter-house arrangements. Schools
and hospitals were funded directly by the state out of its revenues. As of 1908 Shahpura
did not have a municipal board or similar committee. Here again the ruler made spending
decisions relying on one advisor. There is no mention of local town-specific taxes to fund
local services.
If exposure to early taxation engendered stronger norms of informal co-operation, we
would expect participants from (British) Kekri to be more co-operative in public good
games. Although participants of (British) Kekri contribute more to home town groups
than (Princely) Sarwar, the difference was not significant in simple means or regressions.
Rather, we observe differences in the contributions to mixed town groups. Thus, it is unlikely that early exposure to municipal taxation is the underlying mechanism, though it may
be a contributing factor.
What about contemporary public goods? We have suggestive evidence that household
perceptions of police performance are similar across (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar.22
(British) Kekri has a few more schools with 2 schools per 1000 people compared to 1.6 for
22

By chance, a JPAL research team conducted household surveys in Rajasthan in the 2000s asking questions on perception of police performance (Banerjee et al., 2012). They surveyed over 2,000 individuals
in 162 police stations covering 11 districts. Data without any town-level identifiers are publicly available
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/17050. Dan Keniston, a study author, graciously shared the town identifiers with us. In their baseline survey, the JPAL team surveyed 16
households in Kekri and 16 in Sarwar. We find no significant across-town difference in responses to the four
performance questions. They are (1) “Do the police help citizens when they are required?”, (2) “How quick
is the police response to distress calls by citizens?”, (3) “Is it easy or difficult to register an FIR?”, and (4)
“How does the performance of the police compare to other government agencies”. We also coded all the
towns in their data into former British India and Princely India. Again, we find no significant differences in
perception of police performance across British India and Princely India.
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(Princely) Sarwar and 1.7 for (Princely) Shahpura. Kekri has 2.4 hospital beds per 1000
people compared to 2 for Sarwar and 1.7 for Shahpura (Census of India 2011). Yet, it is
unlikely these differences are driving the differences in co-operative norms. For one they are
small differences. Second, we only (consistently) observe Kekri-Sarwar differences in outgroup bias for people with strong family ties to the town. Such public goods are enjoyed
by everyone, not exclusively by people with family ties to the town. Finally, we observe
no differences between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura even though they also
have small differences in the provision of schools and hospital beds. Rather, history seems
important because of the differences between participants with family ties to the towns and
those without.
Unlike studies that emphasize colonial institutions and public goods, Easterly and Levine
(2016) argue that Europeans brought their human capital to the colonies. Literacy was low
in all our towns. However, (British) Kekri had a much larger British presence compared to
(Princely) Sarwar and Shahpura. Although Europeans accounted for less than 1 percent of
the population in colonial India, they lived in the towns of British India. British officials
served as district officers, magistrates, and chairmen of municipal committees, interacting
regularly with the local population. This is especially true in the cities and small towns of
colonial British India. In 1931, the province of Ajmer had 1,524 British subjects, of which
509 were residing in Ajmer city, the capital (Census of 1931). Since the province had only
5 towns, it is likely the 1,015 remaining British subjects were living in the other towns
including Kekri.23 In comparison, there was only one British subject living in the capital
city of Kishangarh in Kishangarh Princely State in 1931.
Another related difference was the strength of the Indian National Movement (Sisson
1972; Rudolph and Rudolph 1984). As the independence movement under Gandhi grew
strong in the 1920s, the Rajputana States were slow to embrace and follow these larger
movements of British India. Indeed, the popular British Indian newspapers did not circulate
23

The Census of 1931 does not record the number of Europeans in the other towns of Ajmer province.
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regularly in the Rajputana Princely states (Sisson 1972). However, (British) Kekri in Ajmer
province was different. Here, national newspapers were commonplace as was nationalist
literature, which was then smuggled out of the surrounding Princely States. Ajmer and by
association Kekri, was the British Indian enclave of Rajasthan. It was connected to the
larger movements in British India. In contrast, the Rajputana states were segmented. They
had less interaction with outside causes and people. According to Sisson (1972), “unlike the
British provinces, elites in the Rajputana states did not develop a statewide constituency
prior to independence. Their support was regional and parochial, and this pattern of regional
segmentation has been a persistent feature of Rajasthan’s politics in the postindependence
period (p. 60).”
People from (British) Kekri, thus, historically interacted with more outsiders and were
part of larger national movements as compared to those from (Princely) Sarwar and Shahpura. If such historical exposure engendered stronger cultural norms for working with outsiders or reduced out-group bias, we would expect participants in (British) Kekri to be more
co-operative in mixed outsider groups compared to (Princely) Sarwar and Shahpura. Indeed,
we find participants from (British) Kekri with family ties to the town contribute more to
mixed town groups compared to (Princely) Sarwar. We observe no such difference between
the two Princely towns. Participants in Kekri may be contributing more than Sarwar because
they anticipate Sarwar participants will contribute more than Sarwar participants anticipate
Kekri participants will contribute. Or, it may be Kekri participants feel a stronger “warmglow” towards Sarwar participants. Our simple experiments cannot identify and separate
the more complex reasons underlying the lower out-group bias in (British) Kekri. What they
show is that contemporary inter-town differences in social norms of co-operation are shaped
by their historical experience of colonial and princely rule.
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7

Conclusion

This paper exploits a natural experiment of a historical boundary to study whether norms
derived from historical settings persist in the long run. We run a lab-in-the-field public goods
game in three towns along a former border separating colonial British India from Princely
India. The relative arbitrariness of the border placement—the towns in question were not
of commercial or strategic importance to the British—along with their similar demographic
characteristics suggest that this is an ideal setting to test the persistence of cultural norms
derived in the colonial period.
Our experiment finds that participants from the Princely India side of the border contribute lower amounts to a joint account when grouped with outsiders compared to participants from the British India side. When we split the participants by their family ties to
the towns, we find that our results are driven by participants whose parents are from these
towns. This suggests a vertical, inter-generational cultural transmission mechanism exists to
some degree. We conjecture that older generations of townspeople exposed to more foreigners and other parts of British India passed these values to their children and grandchildren.
This perhaps accounts for the lower out-group bias we observe today in (British) Kekri.
Our results clearly permit alternative hypotheses. For one, should there be idiosyncratic
differences in these towns for some reason beyond those proposed in our paper, our results
would be spurious. Moreover, external validity is not obvious; after all, these are simply the
results from public good games played in three Indian towns. However, there are numerous
reasons to believe that our results are reflective of cultural transmission. First, the results
only hold for participants with family ties to the town for whom the old colonial border would
be salient. Second, there is a large literature on the persistent effects of colonialism which
suggests that cultural characteristics formed under colonial rule persist, for better or worse
(e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). This paper provides more evidence in this direction,
while employing a new identification strategy. Third, the experiment was run double-blind,
so the experimenters could not subconsciously affect the outcomes in favor of the proposed
40

hypotheses.
Although we do not wish to push the results from an experiment in three Indian towns
too far, they carry implications for the literature on institutions and long-run growth. Most
importantly, our results suggest that culture can persist despite changes in the institutional
setting that were responsible for those cultural attributes in the first place. Hence, to the
extent that a society’s “informal institutions” impinge on its formal institutions, institutions
that “work” in one society may not work in another. In other words, historical processes not
only shape the lens through which people view the world, but also shape how they respond
to the incentives and constraints they face in their economic and social interactions.
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A

Appendix: Robustness Checks
Table A.1: Differences Between Kekri Participants, Oct 6-7 and Oct 20

Oct 6-7 Round Oct 20 Round
Contribution to Mixed Town Group (Sarwar)
Contribution to Mixed Town Group (Shahpura)
Contribution to Co-Townspeople Group

p-value

84.74
81.49
100.65

58.70
52.17
86.96

0.000
0.000
0.029

Female
Age Under 25
Married
Less Than High School
Muslim
SC/ST

0.46
0.34
0.68
0.56
0.03
0.55

0.35
0.3
0.8
0.59
0.07
0.57

0.175
0.617
0.109
0.792
0.321
0.814

Self-Employed
Unpaid Family Worker
Regular Wage Worker
Casual Wage Laborer
Student
Employer
Seeking Work

0.31
0.29
0.16
0.09
0.11
0.01
0.04

0.74
0.04
0.11
0
0.09
0
0.02

0.000
0.001
0.427
0.034
0.650
0.585
0.578

Parents from Village
Lived in Village Entire Life
Know Someone from Other Town
Trust Co-townspeople (1-5)
Trust Outsiders (1-5)

0.8
0.76
0.54
4.14
3.42

0.87
0.85
0.3
3.89
3.13

0.299
0.207
0.005
0.006
0.011

Observations

154
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Notes: p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics, Personal Finance

Town
Kekri (BI)
N = 154

Bank
Borrowed from
Lent to
Account
Co-Townsp.
Co-Townsp.
0.63
0.20
0.23
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)

Borrowed
from Outsider
0.11
(0.03)

Lent to
Outsider
0.14
(0.03)

Use
Microfinance
0.08
(0.02)

Sarwar (PS)
N = 200

0.73
(0.03)

0.24
(0.03)

0.26
(0.03)

0.11
(0.02)

0.11
(0.02)

0.14
(0.02)

Shahpura (PS)
N = 200

0.70
(0.03)

0.26
(0.03)

0.23
(0.03)

0.07
(0.02)

0.11
(0.02)

0.07
(0.02)

0.354
0.354
1.000

0.068
0.777
0.023

Kekri-Sarwar
Kekri-Shahpura
Sarwar-Shahpura

0.044
0.165
0.507

0.387
0.236
0.729

p-values: Difference in Means
0.479
0.871
0.952
0.183
0.486
0.216

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; * p < 0.05; **
p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Contributions to Joint Account, Non-Muslims

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

British
India
Kekri
84.6
(3.30)
56%

Princely
State
Sarwar
78.0
(3.10)
52%

Contribution to
Insider Group
As % of Endowment

101.3
(3.08)
68%

93.6
(3.24)
62%

0.101

93.6
(3.24)
62%

97.8
(3.86)
65%

0.323

More to Home (0/1)

0.40
(0.04)

0.42
(0.04)

0.812

0.45
(0.04)

0.38
(0.05)

0.232

Observations

p-value
0.121

p-value
0.382

132

111

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

132
Parents are from Town
85.7
76.1
0.066
(4.00)
(3.44)
57%
51%

73.3
(3.37)
49%

78.4
(4.40)
52%

0.340

Contribution to
Insider Group
As % of Endowment

97.7
(3.44)
65%

95.6
(3.84)
64%

0.729

95.6
(3.84)
64%

95.3
(4.24)
64%

0.921

More to Home (0/1)

0.37
(0.05)

0.47
(0.05)

0.172

0.50
(0.05)

0.36
(0.05)

0.051

108

90

90

95

Observations

149

Princely Princely
State
State
Sarwar Shahpura
74.6
78.8
(3.02)
(4.02)
50%
53%

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The “Outsiders” decision in the Kekri vs. Sarwar comparison is Decision B, where participants from Kekri shared
a group with those from Sarwar and vice versa. The “Outsiders” decision in the Sarwar vs. Shahpura
comparison is Decision C, where participants from Sarwar shared a group with those from Shahpura and
vice versa.
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Table A.4: Contributions to Joint Account, Non-SC/ST

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

British
India
Kekri
92.9
(5.01)
62%

Princely
State
Sarwar
78.9
(2.90)
53%

Contribution to
Insider Group
As % of Endowment

102.1
(4.49)
68%

94.0
(2.90)
63%

0.144

94.0
(2.90)
63%

95.4
(3.05)
64%

0.746

More to Home (0/1)

0.31
(0.06)

0.41
(0.04)

0.176

0.41
(0.04)

0.42
(0.05)

0.865

Observations

p-value
0.012

p-value
0.605

159

153

Contribution to Mixed
Group (Outsiders)
As % of Endowment

159
Parents are from Town
98.0
78.1
0.003
(6.00)
(5.15)
65%
52%

76.8
(3.58)
51%

74.8
(3.57)
50%

0.700

Contribution to
Insider Group
As % of Endowment

99.0
(5.15)
66%

95.1
(3.35)
63%

0.557

95.1
(3.35)
63%

93.2
(3.48)
62%

0.700

More to Home (0/1)

0.27
(0.06)

0.44
(0.05)

0.039

0.43
(0.05)

0.38
(0.05)

0.499
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112

112

117

Observations

70

Princely Princely
State
State
Sarwar Shahpura
77.4
75.2
(3.08)
(3.22)
52%
50%

Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses; p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The “Outsiders” decision in the Kekri vs. Sarwar comparison is Decision B, where participants from Kekri shared
a group with those from Sarwar and vice versa. The “Outsiders” decision in the Sarwar vs. Shahpura
comparison is Decision C, where participants from Sarwar shared a group with those from Shahpura and
vice versa.
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Table A.5: Ordered Probit, Kekri versus Sarwar, Non-Muslims, Non-SC/ST

Sarwar
Order

N

Sarwar
Order

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
All
All
Parents
All
All
Parents
Participants Participants from Town Participants Participants
from Town
Dep Variable: Contribution to Mixed Town Group, Kekri vs. Sarwar
Non-Muslim
Non-SC/ST
-0.184***
-0.339***
-0.529***
-0.387***
-0.470***
-0.687***
(0.012)
(0.069)
(0.154)
(0.069)
(0.095)
(0.189)
0.194***
0.181***
0.275***
0.169***
0.217**
0.347**
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.030)
(0.050)
(0.086)
(0.163)
281
281
198
229
229
161
Dep Variable: Contribution to Co-Townsperson Group, Kekri vs. Sarwar
Non-Muslim
Non-SC/ST
-0.236***
-0.268***
-0.119
-0.251***
-0.188***
-0.048
(0.018)
(0.088)
(0.145)
(0.030)
(0.050)
(0.063)
0.044**
-0.006
-0.100
0.236***
0.214***
0.141***
(0.021)
(0.032)
(0.072)
(0.023)
(0.030)
(0.045)

N

281

281

198

229

229

161

DEMO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Notes: Ordered probit coefficients. Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second.
Demographic controls include indicators for female, age 15-25, married, less than upper secondary education,
Muslim, and scheduled caste/scheduled tribe.
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B

Experiment Instructions and Materials

In this Appendix, we provide a sample of the instructions that were given to participants
from Kekri in Experiment A. Experiments B and C instructions were shorter and similar,
with the only difference being the town names of the group members. Instructions for Sarwar
and Shahpura were identical, with only town names changed.

B.1

Instructions

This is an experiment in how people make decisions conducted by Nielsen India, an economics
research firm based in India. They are conducting this experiment on behalf of researchers
in India, the UK, and the USA. The instructions are as follows.
You will receive 100 rupees simply for participating in the experiment. If you follow the
instructions carefully, you have the potential to earn more than this. One of the Nielsen
team members will collect your decisions from the experiment, and a different Nielsen team
member will calculate how much you earned during the experiment. You will be paid for
participating in the experiment today and the experimenter will return in one week to pay
you the amount you earned during the experiments.
There are 200 participants taking place in the experiment from Kekri. You and the other
participants will be placed into groups of 4. You will not be told the names of those in your
group and they will not be told your name. All participants have identical instructions.
You are part of a group of four people. Each member of your group will begin the game
with 150 rupees. You have the option to put that money into a personal pot or a joint pot
that you share with your fellow group members. You can put 0, 50, 100 or 150 rupees into
the joint pot, and you keep the rest.
Your income is the amount of money you put in your personal pot (150 your contribution
to the joint pot) + your equal share of twice the joint pot contribution by the four team
members (the experimenter will double the total joint pot contribution of your team and
then each member will receive an equal share from the joint pot).
Before you receive your income, you make one decision: how much to contribute to the joint
pot.
B.1.1

Your Decision

You will be given a handout that asks you to circle the amount you want to contribute to
the joint pot. For example, if you want to give 50 rupees to the joint pot, you should
circle 50 as in the example below:

52

You keep any money you do not put into the joint pot. So, if you choose to put 50 rupees
into the joint pot, as in the above example, you will keep 100 rupees in your personal pot.
B.1.2

Your Income from the Joint Pot

As explained before, for each group member the income from the joint pot is determined
as follows:
Your income from the joint pot =
1
2

* total rupees put into the joint pot by you and all of your group members

For example, if the sum of all contributions—including yours—to the joint pot is 400 rupees,
then the experimenter doubles the 400 rupees to 800 and you receive your share of 800
rupees, which equals to 200 rupees each from the joint pot. If the four group members
together put 300 rupees into the joint pot, you and all others will get an equal share of 150
rupees each from the joint pot. One week after the experiment ends, you will be paid in
cash your share of the joint pot money plus your personal pot money that you did not
contribute to the joint pot.
B.1.3

Your Total Income

Your total income is the sum of your income from the joint pot and the amount you did
not contribute to the joint pot.
Total Income =

=

1
2

Income from the joint pot
* (total contributions from all group members to the joint pot)
+
Income from your personal pot
[150 rupees − your contribution to the joint pot] .

B.1.4

Examples

We will now take you through some examples of how the experiment could proceed. For
each example, we have created diagrams to help your understanding.
Note: Please see Appendix B.4 for a pictorial representation of Example 1.
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose you contributed 50 rupees to the joint pot, and other members in
your group contributed 50, 150 and 100 rupees to the joint pot. Then the total joint pot
contribution is (50+50+150+100) = 350 rupees. All group members will therefore earn their
equal share of half the total joint pot contribution, which is 12 * 350 = 175 rupees. Since you
contributed 50 rupees to the joint pot and kept 100 rupees for your personal pot, your total
income is 100 + 175 = 275 rupees.
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EXAMPLE 2: Suppose you contributed 0 rupees to the joint pot and the other members in
your group contributed 150 rupees each to the joint pot. Then the total joint pot contribution
is (0+150+150+150) = 450 rupees. All group members will therefore earn their equal share
of half the total joint pot contribution, which is 12 * 450 = 225 rupees. Since you did not
contribute anything to the joint pot and kept 150 rupees for your personal pot, your total
income is 150 + 225 = 375 rupees.
EXAMPLE 3: Suppose you contributed 150 rupees to the joint pot and the other members in
your group contributed 0 rupees each to the joint pot. Then the total joint pot contribution
is (150+0+0+0) = 150 rupees. All group members will therefore earn their equal share of
half the total joint pot contribution, which is 12 * 150 = 75 rupees. Since you contributed
150 rupees to the joint pot and kept 0 rupees for your personal pot, your total income is 0
+ 75 = 75 rupees.
The experimenter will now give you a short quiz to test your understanding of the experiment.
Note: The quiz is located in Appendix B.2.
B.1.5

Playing the Game

You have been randomly matched with a group of three other people from Kekri.
The experimenter will now hand you a worksheet. On this worksheet, please circle your
Decision for how much you will contribute to the joint pot. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand and an experimenter will answer your question.
You will play this game only once.

B.2

Experiment Quiz

The purpose of this quiz is to make you familiar with the calculation of incomes that come
from different decisions about the allocation of 150 rupees.
1) Each group member has 150 rupees. Assume that none of the four group members
(including you) contributes anything to the joint pot.
a) What will your total income be?
b) What is the total income of each of the other group members?
2) Each group member has 150 rupees. Assume that you put 150 rupees into the joint pot
and each of the other group members puts 150 rupees into the joint pot.
a) What will your total income be?
b) What is the total income of each of the other group members?
3) Each group member has 150 rupees. Assume that the other three group members together
contribute a total of 250 rupees to the joint pot.
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a) What is your total income if you contribute 0 rupees to the joint pot?
b) What is your total income if you contribute 50 rupees to the joint pot?
c) What is your total income if you contribute 150 rupees to the joint pot?

B.3

Experiment Survey

Note: This survey was given in Kekri. The surveys given in Sarwar and Shahpura were
similar, with only the order and wording of questions 5-7, 18-21, and 23-29 changed to
reflect the town in which the survey was conducted.
Please fill out this brief survey by circling the answer that most accurately applies. If there is
a line next to a question, please enter your answer on the line. Your entries are confidential:
none of the information in this survey will ever be matched to your name or shared with
anybody outside of those conducting the experiment.
1) What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
2) What is your age?
a. 15-25
b. 25-40
c. 40-55
d. 55-70
e. 70 or older
3) What is your marital status?
a. Single
b. Married
c. Divorced
d. Widowed
e. Other

b. No
6) If you answered No to Question 5, how long
have you lived in Kekri?
7) To your knowledge, how long has your family lived in Kekri?
a. You moved to Kekri during your lifetime
b. Your parents moved to Kekri
c. Your grandparents moved to Kekri
d. Your great-grandparents or an older
generation moved to Kekri
e. I don’t know
8) Do you live in a joint family?
a. Yes
b. No

4) What is the highest level of education you
9) What is your primary occupation?
completed?
a. Own account worker (self-employed)
a. Up to Class 5
b. Unpaid family worker
b. Class 5 to Class 9
c. Regular salaried or wage worker
c. Class 10
d. Casual wage labourer
d. Class 12
e. Employer
e. Pre-University/College
f. Seeking and/or available for work
f. University/College
5) Have you lived in Kekri your entire life?
a. Yes

10) What is your religion?
a. Hindu
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b. Muslim
c. Christian
d. Jain
e. Sikh
f. None/non-religious
g. Other (please list)

17) Do you have a bank account?
a. Yes
b. No
18) Have you ever borrowed money from
someone outside of your family living in
Kekri?
a. Yes
b. No

11) Is your caste SC, ST, OBC or Other?
a. SC
b. ST
c. OBC
d. Other

19) Have you ever lent money to someone outside of your family living in Kekri?
a. Yes
b. No

12) What is your sub-caste, i.e., jati?
20) Have you ever borrowed money from
someone living outside of Kekri?
a. Yes
13) How often do you attend religious serb. No
vices?
a. Never
21) Have you ever lent money to someone livb. Once or twice a year (or less)
ing outside of Kekri?
c. Several times a year
a. Yes
d. Once a month
b. No
e. 2-3 times a month
f. Weekly
22) Do you use a microfinance scheme?
g. Several times a week
a. Yes
b. No
14) Do you attend religious services in a place
of worship (temple, mosque, gurudwara) or 23) How trustworthy, in general, do you think
the people of Kekri are?
do you mainly pray at home?
a. Extremely trustworthy
a. Attend services
b. Somewhat trustworthy
b. Mainly pray at home
c. Uncertain
c. Both
d. Somewhat untrustworthy
e. Extremely untrustworthy
15) Do you think that education (schooling)
is well-provided for in your town?
24) Do you know anybody from Sarwar?
a. Yes
a. Yes
b. No
b. No
c. Not sure
25) How trustworthy, in general, do you think
16) Do you think that health-care (primary the people of Sarwar are?
health clinic) is well-provided for in your
a. Extremely trustworthy
town?
b. Somewhat trustworthy
a. Yes
c. Uncertain
b. No
d. Somewhat untrustworthy
c. Not sure
e. Extremely untrustworthy
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26) Do you know anybody from Shahpura?
a. Yes
b. No

b. No

29) Did you make choices differently when
your partner was from Kekri than when they
27) How trustworthy, in general, do you think were from Shahpura?
the people of Shahpura are?
a. Yes
a. Extremely trustworthy
b. No
b. Somewhat trustworthy
c. Uncertain
30) If you answered Yes to Question 28 or 29,
d. Somewhat untrustworthy
why did you make your choices differently?
e. Extremely untrustworthy
Please answer below, and use as much space
28) Did you make choices differently when as needed.
your partner was from Kekri than when they
were from Sarwar?
31) Why did you participate in this experia. Yes
ment?

B.4

Pictorial Example

In this Appendix, we include the eight pictorials that experimenters showed to subjects while
explaining example number 1 in the instructions. Similar pictorials were used for examples
2 and 3, with different rupee amounts corresponding to the examples.
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There are 4 members in the group
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₹ 150

₹ 150

₹ 150

₹ 150

Each member is given ₹ 150 in their personal pots
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₹ 150

₹ 150

₹ 150

₹ 150

There is a joint pot for the group
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₹ 100

₹ 50
₹ 50

₹ 50

₹ 100

₹ 150

₹ 100

₹0

Each member decides how much to contribute without
knowing what the other members are contributing

61

₹ 100

₹ 50

₹ 100

₹0

All the contributions add up in the joint pot and each member
retains the remaining amount in their personal pot

62

₹ 100

₹ 50

₹ 100

₹0

The joint pot amount gets doubled

63

₹ 100

₹ 175
₹ 50

₹ 175

₹ 100

₹ 175
₹ 175
₹0

The doubled amount is equally distributed between the four members

64

₹ 275

₹ 225

₹ 275

₹ 175

Each member ends up with the sum of the amount received from the joint pot and
whatever he/she had retained in their personal pot

65

